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For the first time in almost twenty years, the Minnesota 
legislature has altered the statutory procedures for canceling 
residential purchase agreements.  The 2004 legislature instituted 
two new procedures for cancellation of residential purchase 
agreements, both of which will significantly change current 
practices. 
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I. SECTION 559.21 AND ROMAIN 
A. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners1 
Minnesota is virtually unique in American law as having a 
statutory non-judicial process that provides for the quick 
termination of the rights of a purchaser under a contract for deed, 
also known as an installment land contract.2  Minnesota Statutes 
section 559.21 provides for a process whereby, upon a default by a 
buyer under a contract for deed, the seller can terminate all rights 
of the buyer under the contract for deed without invoking the 
jurisdiction of a court.3  The statute provides that if a default occurs 
that would give the seller a right to terminate the contract, the 
seller can serve notice, in the form prescribed by statute, on the 
buyer.4  If the buyer fails to cure defaults within the statutorily 
specified time, typically sixty days after service of the notice, the 
contract is deemed terminated and an affidavit of such service and 
failure to comply constitutes prima facie evidence of the 
termination.5 
Statutory termination under section 559.21 applies if “a default 
occurs in the conditions of a contract for the conveyance of real 
estate . . . [that gives] the seller a right to terminate it.”6  In Romain 
v. Pebble Creek Partners,7 the Minnesota Supreme Court was directly 
faced with the issue of whether section 559.21 applies to a purchase 
agreement.8 
In Romain, the court first noted that it was indisputable that 
the statute applied to a “contract for deed.”9  While noting that 
there is no definitive definition of a contract for deed, the court 
pointed out its primary characteristics: that “vendor and vendee are 
bound to sale and purchase by definite terms; the vendee usually 
 
 1. 310 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 1981). 
 2. Iowa is the only other state with a similar cancellation statute.  See IOWA 
CODE ANN. §§ 656.1-.6 (West 1995). 
 3. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (2002). 
 4. Id. subd. 3. 
 5. Id. subd. 4(e). 
 6. Id. subd. 2a. 
 7. 310 N.W.2d 118 (Minn. 1981). 
 8. The 1978 version of section 559.21 at issue in Romain was phrased slightly 
different than the current statute and applied “[w]hen default is made in the 
conditions of any contract for the conveyance of real estate . . . whereby the 
vendor has a right to terminate the same.”  Id. at 120. 
 9. Id. 
2
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takes possession; and the contract works an equitable conversion, the 
vendor retaining legal title and the vendee having equitable title.”10  
Thus, a contract for deed is primarily a financing instrument.  The 
court in Romain went on to contrast a contract for deed with a 
purchase agreement. 
[T]he distinction between contracts for deed and 
purchase agreements is similarly unclear.  A purchase 
agreement (or earnest money contract) often is a 
preliminary contract “to bind the bargain” until the 
closing, at which time possession is delivered and title is 
passed by deed or contract for deed.  The purchase 
agreement frequently is conditioned on certain material 
terms respecting title or financing being satisfied in the 
interim period before closing.11 
A purchase agreement, in contrast to a contract for deed, is 
not a financing device but rather is normally of a short-term 
duration under which the buyer does not pay interest, take 
possession, or enjoy beneficial use of the property.  As such, a 
purchase agreement is more in the nature of a holding instrument 
that keeps the parties bound while certain tasks, such as examining 
title, arranging financing, or seeking rezoning, are accomplished. 
Romain adopted the view that statutory termination under 
section 559.21 applies regardless of whether the contract is a 
purchase agreement or a contract for deed.12  The issue of the 
applicability of section 559.21 is not resolved by whether an 
instrument is labeled a contract for deed or a purchase agreement, 
and “is not dependent on how the parties may have manipulated 
the contract language.”13  Under Romain, a contract may be 
statutorily cancelled if the agreement is “sufficiently certain and 
complete in its essential terms that ordinarily specific performance 
will lie.”14  The inquiry is “whether a term essential to the final 
bargain is left open for further negotiations or is dependent on a 
contingency.”15 
While mentioned only in passing in Romain, the doctrine of 
equitable conversion is central to understanding the case.  The 
doctrine of equitable conversion is based on the maxim that 
 
 10. Id. (emphasis added). 
 11. Id. at 121. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 122. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
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“[e]quity regards and treats that as done which in good conscience 
ought to be done.”16  Because real property is unique, a purchaser 
under a definite, non-contingent agreement has the remedy of 
specific performance.17  Upon payment of the specified purchase 
price, the purchaser is entitled to an order requiring the seller to 
execute and deliver a deed.18  Equity principles treat that which 
ought to be done, that is, delivery of the deed, as being done 
throughout the term of the contract.19  Therefore, despite the fact 
that the seller has not given a deed and has only entered into a 
contract, equity regards the purchaser as the equitable owner and 
the seller as the holder of mere legal title to the property. 
Most importantly, under equitable conversion, the buyer has a 
property interest in the real estate that is the subject of the 
contract.  As such, the buyer’s property interest constitutes both a 
cloud on the seller’s title and a right, upon payment of the 
purchase price, to entirely oust the seller of all title.  Moreover, as a 
property interest, the buyer’s equitable interest does not simply 
disappear if the buyer fails to timely perform.  That property 
interest can be extinguished by means of a deed from the seller to 
the buyer (or other consensual instrument signed by the buyer).  
Short of such an instrument, that property interest remains extant.  
Thus, under Romain, the conclusion that equitable conversion has 
occurred means not only that section 559.21 applies to the contract 
in question, but that, absent a deed (or other consensual 
instrument) from the buyer, until statutory termination has been 
effected, the buyer has a property interest that prevents the seller 
from selling the real estate to a third party and that will permit the 
buyer to acquire the seller’s interest in the real estate. 
As Romain recognized, equitable conversion may apply to a 
purchase agreement as well as a contract for deed.20  Thus, in the 
case of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement, equitable 
conversion will have occurred and the buyer under the mere 
 
 16. Gilles v. Sprout, 293 Minn. 53, 59, 196 N.W.2d 612, 615 (1972). 
 17. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 122. 
 18. See Schumacher v. Ihrke, 469 N.W.2d 329, 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) 
(upholding the trial court’s grant of specific performance, even though other 
remedies may be available, because real property is unique). 
 19. See Gilles, 293 Minn. at 59, 196 N.W.2d at 615. 
 20. See Stiernagle v. County of Waseca, 511 N.W.2d 4, 5 (Minn. 1994) (“[A] 
contract for deed works an equitable conversion of the real property conveyed.”); 
Frederick v. Peoples State Bank of Madison Lake, 385 N.W.2d 11, 13 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1986) (“[E]quitable conversion occurs at the time a purchase agreement is 
signed.”). 
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purchase agreement will have a property interest—an interest 
which remains outstanding unless and until the buyer executes a 
deed (or other instrument) or the seller effectuates statutory 
termination under section 559.21.21 
The Romain court went on to analyze the particular purchase 
agreement at issue in the case before it.22  The agreement provided 
that the purchase price would be payable at closing by means of a 
promissory note given by the buyers to the sellers, the security for 
which was not (as is customary) the real estate being purchased, 
but rather other collateral satisfactory to the seller.23  If an 
agreement regarding such other security was not made, the 
purchase agreement would then be null and void.24  The court 
concluded that, given the significance of the collateral for the 
payment obligation, “there was an essential term left open” and 
“that it became null and void by reason of the parties’ not reaching 
agreement on security for the note; and, consequently, that notice 
under section 559.21 to terminate the purchasers’ interest was not 
needed.”25  In effect, the court concluded that because the 
purchase agreement was not sufficiently definite to permit the 
buyers to procure specific performance of the agreement, 
equitable conversion had not occurred, the buyers did not have a 
property interest in the underlying real estate, and statutory 
termination under section 559.21 was not required to extinguish 
any real estate interest of the buyers.26  Ironically then, while the 
teaching of Romain is that section 559.21 applies to purchase 
agreements and that a purchase agreement may require statutory 
cancellation, the actual holding of the case is that the particular 
purchase agreement at issue did not warrant termination.27 
In addition to the situation of the failure to stipulate collateral 
for the unpaid purchase agreement, Romain noted prior cases 
involving purchase agreements where the termination statute did 
not apply and, in effect, where no statutory termination was 
required to extinguish a property interest in the buyer.28  Thus, in 
the case where a title defect not due to the fault of the seller made 
 
 21. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (2002). 
 22. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 119. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 122-23. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. Id. at 121. 
5
Wertheim: Minnesota’s New Residential Purchase Agreement Cancellation Statu
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2004
12WERTHEIM 3/29/2005  2:52:42 PM 
692 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:2 
title unmarketable, the purchase agreement ended by its terms 
without the need for a cancellation notice.29  Similarly, the Romain 
court recognized that statutory termination is not required in the 
case of a purchase agreement that is subject to an unsatisfied 
financing contingency, the failure of which voids the agreement.30  
That latter rule has also been followed in a post-Romain case.31  In 
addition, other case law indicates that an option, until exercised, 
will normally not be subject to section 559.21 based on the theory 
that an unexercised option is not binding on both parties and 
hence not subject to specific performance.32 
Nevertheless, the Romain court also pointed to prior cases 
which did require that definite, non-contingent purchase 
agreements be terminated under the statutory procedure.33  These 
purchase agreements themselves provided that if the buyer failed 
to make timely payments to the seller, the contract either would be 
null and void or would end.34  Romain recognized that the 
applicability of section 559.21 “is not dependent on how the parties 
may have manipulated the contract language.”35  Thus, mere 
insertion of language that failure of a party to perform 
automatically nullifies or ends the contract does not avoid the 
applicability of the termination statute to an otherwise definite, 
non-contingent purchase agreement. 
Recently, the Minnesota Court of Appeals has reaffirmed that 
 
 29. Joslyn v. Schwend, 85 Minn. 130, 88 N.W. 410 (1901) (cited by Romain, 
310 N.W.2d at 121).  This case, which involved an actual title defect that rendered 
title unmarketable, should not be read to stand for the proposition that the mere 
existence of a contingency for title examination precludes equitable conversion.  
Virtually all purchase agreements contain such a contingency and such a rule 
would, in effect, make section 559.21 inapplicable to all purchase agreements, a 
conclusion rejected by Romain. 
 30. See Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 121 (citing Liebsch v. Abbott, 265 Minn. 447, 
456, 122 N.W.2d 578, 584 (1963) and Chapman v. Salem Lutheran Church, 301 
Minn. 486, 487-88, 221 N.W.2d 129, 130 (1974)). 
 31. Jones v. Amoco Oil Co., 483 N.W.2d 718, 724 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). 
 32. See Rooney v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 310 Minn. 256, 267-68, 246 N.W.2d 
170, 176 (1976); see also In re Hilltop Dev. v. Miller Hill Manor Co., 342 N.W.2d 
344, 348 (Minn. 1984) (holding that if the option has been exercised, a contract is 
created and the cancellation statute applies).  But see M.L. Gordon Sash & Door 
Co. v. Mormann, 271 N.W.2d 436, 441 (Minn. 1978) (holding, albeit not in the 
context of a cancellation, that in equity an unmistakable option granted a 
purchaser a “property interest” so as to defeat an intervening judgment creditor). 
 33. Ballard v. Friedman, 151 Minn. 493, 187 N.W. 518 (1922); Finnes v. 
Selover, Bates & Co., 102 Minn. 334, 113 N.W. 883 (1907). 
 34. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 121-22. 
 35. Id. at 122. 
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“[r]eal estate purchase agreements are unique because they are 
subject to the provisions of” section 559.21.36  In another recent 
case, the court of appeals concluded that because a purchase 
agreement was definite and not subject to contingencies, the buyer 
would be entitled to the notice and cure rights under section 
559.21 in the event of the buyer’s default—notwithstanding the fact 
that the purchase agreement provided that the agreement would 
be “null and void and of no consequence to either party” if the 
buyer failed to perform.37 
B. Romain’s Rationale 
As an initial matter, one might question the very reasoning of 
Romain’s initial conclusion, that is, why should any purchase 
agreement ever be subject to statutory cancellation?  Although 
Romain analyzes the statutory framework of section 559.21, the 
court does not delve into the underlying policy or rationales.  The 
justification for its conclusions is not as clear as one might initially 
suspect. 
There is little question that a buyer under a contract for deed, 
who has typically gone into possession, who has attained significant 
equity in the property through the down payment, and possibly 
installment payments, to the seller, but who has defaulted in 
installment payments (or the final balloon payment), should be 
entitled to a statutorily imposed cure period and should not lose 
his or her equity without notice and a right of cure.  It is not so 
clear, however, why a buyer under a purchase agreement, who has 
not gone into possession, who has normally made only a nominal 
payment of earnest money, who has invested no real equity in the 
property, but who has failed to show up at closing, should likewise 
be entitled to a statutorily-imposed cure period.  There are typically 
far greater equities in favor of the contract for deed buyer. 
In addition, the impact of applying section 559.21 to a 
purchase agreement seller may, in fact, be far more onerous than 
applying section 559.21 to a contract for deed seller.  In the 
situation of a contract for deed seller, the statutory notice and cure 
period38 will normally only delay the seller’s receipt of promised 
 
 36. Edina Dev. Corp. v. Hurrle, 670 N.W.2d 592, 597 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003). 
 37. TNT Props., Ltd. v. Tri-Star Developers LLC, 677 N.W.2d 94, 103-04 
(Minn. Ct. App. 2004). 
 38. MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 2(a) (2002).  “[N]otice must state that the 
contract will terminate sixty days, or a shorter period allowed in subdivision 4, 
7
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installment payments or, if the contract is terminated, the seller 
may receive a windfall.  In applying section 559.21 to a purchase 
agreement, however, the statutory notice and cure period39 will 
leave the seller (whose primary purpose was to conclusively dispose 
of the property) in limbo and frustrated in his ability to remarket 
the property to another buyer; if the purchase agreement is 
terminated, the seller will only recover the typically nominal 
earnest money. 
This situation can be exacerbated by a companion statute to 
section 559.21, section 559.211, which allows a court, upon motion 
of a buyer in connection with a civil action against the seller, to 
extend the cure period indefinitely by means of a temporary 
restraining order or a temporary injunction.40  Furthermore, even if 
the temporary injunction against the termination is ultimately 
lifted because the buyer’s action is found to be without merit, the 
injunction statute provides that the contract does not terminate for 
fifteen days after the temporary injunction or restraining order is 
lifted.41 
Thus, in effect, a buyer under a purchase agreement meeting 
the Romain test has an automatic right to extend the closing date 
until a minimum thirty-day period after the seller serves the 
statutory notice and such period can be extended thereafter 
indefinitely by court order (and, in all cases, for a minimum of 
fifteen more days after a temporary injunction or order is lifted).42  
Since all the buyer risks by running out the statutory cure period is 
the loss of earnest money, which often may be an amount as little as 
$500, it may appear an unfair bargain to force a seller to keep the 
property off the market pending completion of the termination 
proceeding.  In effect, under Romain, by risking only what may be a 
nominal amount of earnest money, a defaulting buyer can “buy” at 
least thirty days and perhaps much longer for the purpose of 
keeping the property tied up and attempting to eventually close. 
In defense of Romain, however, it can be seen as a modest 
attempt to avoid unfair forfeitures by purchase agreement buyers of 
both their earnest money, and more importantly, the right to buy 
 
after the service of the notice” unless the purchaser is able to cure the defaults 
prior to the termination date.  Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See MINN. STAT. § 559.211 (2002). 
 41. Id. subd. 1. 
 42. Edina Dev. Corp., 670 N.W.2d at 597 (citing MINN. STAT. §§ 559.21 subds. 
(2)(a), (4)(a);  559.211, subd. 1). 
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intrinsically unique real estate.  It reflects a policy judgment that 
while there may be abuses, it is a reasonable compromise of the 
competing interests and the importance of making sure that 
Minnesota buyers are protected. 
Even if one concludes that applying section 559.21 to purchase 
agreements makes sense as a matter of public policy, one might 
question the specific test for applying section 559.21 to the 
purchase agreement under Romain—basing the applicability of 
section 559.21 to the existence of a definite and non-contingent 
purchase agreement.43  As to a definite purchase agreement where 
all material terms are agreed upon, the test that the purchase 
agreement in Romain failed,44 it makes sense that if a purchase 
agreement is not definite with respect to all major terms, a court 
could not grant specific performance to the buyer.  In that case, 
equitable conversion has not occurred, the buyer does not have a 
property interest, and there is nothing “there” upon which one 
could require that the statute act so as to extinguish a property 
interest in the buyer. 
More questionable is a purchase agreement containing a 
contingency to the buyer’s performance or an unexercised option, 
both of which, under Romain, do not require application of the 
statute.45  In those cases it is true that a seller would not be entitled 
to specific performance against the buyer.  In the case of the 
contingent purchase agreement, the buyer’s obligations are 
contingent on satisfying a particular condition.  Similarly, in the 
case of an unexercised option, the buyer has no obligations 
whatsoever until the option is exercised.  However, in the case of 
both the contingent purchase agreement and the unexercised 
option, the buyer could usually unilaterally place him or herself in 
the position of being entitled to specific performance against the 
seller by simply waiving the contingency, in the case of a contingent 
purchase agreement, or by tendering notice of exercise of the 
option, in the case of an option agreement.  In other words, in 
both cases the seller lacks the remedy of specific performance, 
while the buyer, as a practical and customary matter, can avail him 
or herself of that remedy. 
 
 43. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 1981).  
“[T]he agreement must be sufficiently certain and complete in its essential terms 
that ordinarily specific performance will lie.”  Id. 
 44. See id. at 122-23. 
 45. Id. at 121. 
9
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One must then ask why the absence of mutuality of the remedy 
of specific performance precludes the applicability of the statute 
when the purpose of applying the requirement of statutory 
termination is to reflect the buyer’s right to specific performance 
under the doctrine of equitable conversion.  Perhaps the answer is 
that what is “good for the goose is good for the gander.”  Buyers 
should not have the protection of the termination statute if they 
are not also at risk for a claim of specific performance by the seller 
if they fail to perform.46 
Regardless of the policy issues, in 1985, as part of a general re-
write of the cancellation statute, the legislature essentially codified 
the Romain case and the applicability of section 559.21 to purchase 
agreements.47  In an amendment to section 559.21, the legislature 
recognized both the difference between purchase agreements and 
contracts for deed and the Romain rule for determining the 
applicability of the statute to purchase agreements.48  In particular, 
the legislature modified the cancellation statute to provide that 
earnest money contracts, purchase agreements, and exercised 
options “that are subject to” section 559.21 may be terminated with 
a thirty-day notice (unless by their terms they provide for a longer 
termination period), rather than with the customary sixty-day 
notice applicable to traditional contracts for deed.49  Application of 
a minimum thirty-day notice period to earnest money contracts, 
purchase agreements, and exercised options reflects the lesser 
equities applicable to a defaulting purchase agreement buyer, as 
contrasted with a defaulting contract for deed buyer.  More 
importantly, for the issues presented here, the statute’s reference 
to purchase agreements (or earnest money contracts or exercised 
 
 46. Also, in the case of a contingent purchase agreement, a buyer is typically 
not risking the earnest money while the contingency is outstanding.  Therefore, it 
might be reasoned that until a buyer’s earnest money is at risk of forfeiture, that is, 
until the contingency is satisfied (or waived), a buyer has not “paid” for the right 
to require statutory termination. 
 47. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002).   
 48. Id. 
 49. Id.  The reference to “exercised” options is a recognition that while an 
unexercised option is not subject to the statute, an exercised option may be.  In re 
Hilltop Dev. Miller Hill Manor Co., 342 N.W.2d 344, 348 (Minn. 1984).   The post-
Romain legislation also revised the statutorily required notice in section 559.21, 
subdivision 3, to refer to “your contract for the purchase of your property,” in lieu 
of the prior reference to “your contract for deed.”  MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 
4(a).  The earlier verbiage was relied upon by the sellers in Romain for their 
argument that the statute did not apply to purchase agreements.  Romain, 310 
N.W.2d at 121. 
10
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options) “that are subject to” the termination statute was an 
unmistakable recognition that the Romain rule makes only definite, 
non-contingent purchase agreements subject to section 559.21.50  
Furthermore, the caveat was needed so as to avoid any implication 
that the legislature intended to either abandon the Romain rule or 
to make the statute applicable to all purchase agreements. 
C. Problems with Romain 
The primary problem with the Romain test is that it lacks 
certainty.  It may not be easy to determine whether a particular 
purchase agreement meets the Romain requirements of 
definiteness and non-contingency.  The court itself recognized this 
when it concluded that the decision leaves “some uncertainty in the 
application of section 559.21, which the prudent counselor will 
have to take into account.”51  This is particularly a problem where 
the question is the existence of an unsatisfied contingency.  
Without statutory termination there always remains the risk that the 
buyer will satisfy an outstanding contingency, such as financing or 
rezoning, and will then acquire an equitable interest that must be 
statutorily terminated.  In fact, unless the purchase agreement 
specifically requires that the buyer provide written notice (or 
evidence) that the particular contingency has been satisfied, a 
seller may not even be aware of whether or not the contingency has 
been met.  Moreover, most contingencies, such as financing, 
inspection, and land use approvals, can be waived by the buyer; a 
waived contingency is no longer a contingency that will prevent the 
application of the termination statute. 
A buyer under a contingent purchase agreement who is unable 
to timely close may voluntarily waive all contingencies (other than 
title).  The effect of waiving all contingencies will be to make 
section 559.21 applicable to the defaulted purchase agreement and 
trigger a need for the seller to serve the thirty-day cancellation 
notice, which will assure the buyer an additional minimum thirty 
days to close after seller serves the statutory notice of termination.  
Thus, even if the purchase agreement was originally not subject to 
section 559.21 due to a contingency, and even if the event (such as 
financing or rezoning) that is the subject of the contingency has 
not occurred, a buyer might unilaterally transform the purchase 
 
 50. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a).   
 51. Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 123. 
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agreement into an agreement that is subject to (and requires) 
statutory termination.52 
The risk of ignoring (or incorrectly applying) Romain can be 
devastating to a seller.  In the situation of a “busted” transaction, a 
seller might elect (either out of ignorance or out of a mistaken 
belief that the purchase agreement did not meet the Romain test) 
not to serve the section 559.21 notice of termination.  Believing 
that the first purchase agreement is no longer effective, the seller 
may then enter into a second purchase agreement that is not 
subject to cancellation of the first purchase agreement.  If, 
however, the believed-to-be-dead first purchase agreement rises up 
(by means of an action for specific performance by the first buyer), 
the result is that the seller will be caught between the proverbial 
rock and a hard place.  The seller cannot close on either the first or 
the second purchase agreements.  The filing of a lis pendens by the 
first purchaser will create a cloud on title that prevents closing on 
the sale to the second purchaser.  Likewise, if the seller seeks to 
close with the first purchaser, that closing will be unsuccessful since 
the seller will have to disclose under the customary seller’s affidavit 
that the seller has entered into a second purchase agreement.  The 
end result will likely be that both the first purchaser and the second 
purchaser will successfully sue the seller for selling the same 
property twice. 
Therefore, as a matter of prudence, if there is any uncertainty 
regarding the application of Romain to a particular purchase 
agreement, in the absence of a quitclaim deed or other consensual 
termination from the buyer on a “busted” sale, a well-advised seller 
will use statutory termination.  Service of the section 559.21 notice 
will give a tardy, and perhaps undeserving buyer an additional 
thirty days to close.53  Nevertheless, the risks of ignoring or 
 
 52. The buyer’s waiver of the contingency will normally result in the buyer’s 
earnest money being retained by the seller in the event that the buyer does not 
close after service of the statutory notice of termination.  In effect, the buyer will 
have risked the otherwise refundable earnest money as the price of getting the 
additional thirty days to close.  That is often small comfort to a seller more 
concerned about remarketing the property than retaining what is often a small 
earnest money deposit. 
     53. One might consider adding a proviso to the notice of cancellation that 
the notice is being given without prejudice to the seller’s right to claim that no 
notice is required.  However, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Murray v. 
Nickerson, held that the seller could not have it both ways and that the seller giving 
the statutory notice was sufficient for the court to conclude that the parties treated 
the agreement as more than an option.  90 Minn. 197, 202-03, 95 N.W. 898, 900 
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incorrectly applying Romain are such that the benefits of certainty 
outweigh the costs of unnecessarily providing the statutory notice. 
Aside from general concerns about uncertainty in the 
application of section 559.21 to purchase agreements, particular 
concerns have been expressed regarding the applicability of section 
559.21 to residential purchase agreements.  Despite the shortened 
cure period allowed for purchase agreements, many residential 
brokers have believed that the statutory scheme did not adequately 
address the problems all too often experienced in “busted” 
residential real estate transactions.  Transactions typically fail either 
because the seller or the buyer would choose to back out and 
thereby breach the agreement, or a contingency, typically for 
financing or inspection, would not be timely fulfilled.  In most 
situations, the seller and buyer would simply sign a cancellation 
agreement (as typically required by the form purchase agreement) 
that directs to whom the broker was to deliver the earnest money. 
However, brokers reported that too often either or both the 
parties would refuse to sign the cancellation agreement.  As a 
result, in the case of buyer recalcitrance, (a) the seller would face 
the uncertainty of whether, due to contingencies, a section 559.21 
termination was even required and how to secure the earnest 
money, or (b) if it was determined that statutory termination was 
required or desirable, the seller would face at least a thirty-day 
delay in waiting out the cure period before receiving the earnest 
money and putting the house back on the market. 
Also, section 559.21 is only a remedy available to sellers and 
does not assist a buyer in the case of seller recalcitrance.  If either 
the seller defaulted or the purchase agreement failed by reason of a 
contingency and the seller was unwilling to refund the earnest 
money to the buyer, a buyer had no extra-judicial remedy to 
determine that the purchase agreement was terminated and that 
the buyer was entitled to the earnest money.  Thus, in the case of 
seller recalcitrance, a buyer was invariably required to go to court 
to seek judicial relief (often over a relatively small sum of money). 
Furthermore, section 559.21 is only available in the case of 
default (and only the buyer’s default at that) and no procedure is 
available where a purchase agreement fails by reason of an 
unfulfilled condition.  If, for example, a buyer’s financing 
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commence a section 559.21 proceeding, but rather, could only 
serve a statutory notice when the buyer actually went into default.    
Finally, in the case of either seller or buyer recalcitrance, 
absent a section 559.21 termination or a court order, brokers 
holding the earnest money had no mechanism upon which they 
could rely to determine to whom the money should go.  Without 
going through the thirty-plus day section 559.21 procedure (or if 
section 559.21 was believed inapplicable), a broker holding earnest 
money would face potential liability by disbursing the earnest 
money to the wrong party or would simply have to hold the money 
until the parties went to court. 
II. NEW CANCELLATION LEGISLATION 
As a result of those concerns, the Minnesota legislature 
responded and adopted, as alternatives to termination under 
section 559.21, two new cancellation procedures for residential 
purchase agreements: cancellation with right to cure and 
declaratory cancellation.54  These new procedures apply only to 
purchase agreements for residential real property entered into on 
or after August 1, 2004.55  Residential real property is defined as 
“real property, including vacant land, occupied by, or intended to 
 
 54. 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 203, art. I, §§ 9-10.  For ease of reference, citations to 
the new legislation will refer to Minnesota Statutes section 559.217 (2004) to 
which the new legislation is to be codified.  As discussed infra, the new section’s 
title, “Declaratory Cancellation of Purchase Agreement,” is something of a 
misnomer in that section 559.217 provides for two new means of cancelling a 
purchase agreement, only one of which deals with declaratory cancellation.  MINN. 
STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4 (2004).  The other, cancellation with right to cure, does 
not purport to declare or confirm a contract already cancelled, but, like section 
559.21, provides a mechanism to cancel a purchase agreement that has not been 
purportedly cancelled.  Id. subd. 3.  Also, as a matter of nomenclature, although 
section 559.21 uses the words “terminate” and “termination,” section 559.217 uses 
the terms “cancel” and “cancellation.”  Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21 with MINN. 
STAT. § 559.217, subd. 1(b).  In addition, section 559.217 refers to “suspension” of 
the cancellation process, rather than enjoining or restraining the cancellation.  
Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.211 (2002) with MINN. STAT. § 559.217. 
 55. Like the language authorizing a shortened thirty-day period for 
termination under section 559.21, subdivision 4(a), the new legislation applies to 
an “earnest money contract, purchase agreement, or exercised option” and goes 
on to define a “purchase agreement” as any one of those instruments.  MINN. STAT. 
§ 559.217, subd. 1(b).  Because section 559.217 uses the same terminology that 
section 559.21 uses to distinguish such holding instruments from the other 
instruments subject to section 559.21, that is, contracts for deed, it is clear that 
section 559.217 does not apply to contracts for deed.  There is, however, no strict 
statutory definition of what is or is not a contract for deed.   
14
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be occupied by, one to four families as their residence.”56  There 
are no dollar limits on the purchase agreements subject to the new 
legislation; it covers all residential purchase agreements. 57 
A. Cancellation With Right to Cure 
Of the two, the cancellation with right to cure procedure is 
more similar to section 559.21.58  It may be used where a default has 
occurred or an unfulfilled condition exists after the date specified 
for fulfillment under a residential purchase agreement, which 
“does not by its terms” cancel the purchase agreement.59  Under 
that procedure, a party may serve a fifteen-day notice on the other 
party and any third party holding the earnest money.60  The 
contract is then cancelled if the party upon whom notice is served 
does not, within fifteen days of service, either (a) comply with the 
conditions in default and complete the unfulfilled conditions, 
including, if applicable, completion of the purchase or sale or (b) 
secure a court order suspending the cancellation.61 
B. Declaratory Cancellation 
The second procedure, declaratory cancellation, may be used 
where a default has occurred or an unfulfilled condition exists after 
the date specified for fulfillment under a residential purchase 
agreement, which does “by the terms of the purchase agreement” 
cancel the purchase agreement.62  Under that procedure, a party 
may serve a fifteen-day notice on the other party and any third 
party holding the earnest money, and the contract is cancelled if 
the party upon whom notice is served does not, within the fifteen 
 
 56. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 1(c).  If the seller resides on the property, it 
would presumably qualify as residential even if the buyer did not intend to occupy 
it as residential.  See id.  If not already residential, however, it is presumably the 
intent of the buyer, not the seller, that matters.  Thus, property not occupied as 
residential by a seller would be deemed “residential” as long as the buyer intended 
to occupy the property as residential.  Query: What if the buyer under the 
purchase agreement is buying vacant land to construct a residence to be sold to a 
subsequent owner-occupant?  What if the buyer is a developer or speculator who 
will sell to that builder? 
 57. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 1(c).   
 58. Id.  subd. 3. 
 59. Id.  subd. 3(a). 
 60. Id.  subd. 3(b)-(c). 
 61. Id.   
 62. Id. subd. 4(a).  With respect to use of declaratory cancellation in the case 
of a default, rather than an unfulfilled condition, see infra Part III.   
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days, secure a court order suspending the cancellation.63  In 
contrast to cancellation with right to cure (and termination under 
section 559.21), under declaratory cancellation, which merely seeks 
to confirm a cancellation after-the-fact, there is no right to cure the 
default or to satisfy the unfulfilled contingency. 
C. Comparison to Section 559.21 
In many respects, the new cancellation procedures are virtually 
identical to those of section 559.21.  For both cancellation with 
right to cure and declaratory cancellation, service on the other 
party must be made in the same manner as section 559.21,64 and 
the statutorily specified forms of notice are similar, although not 
identical, to the section 559.21 notice form.65  In addition, like 
section 559.21 terminations, cancellation under the two new 
procedures cancels the contract, making it void and of no further 
force or effect.66  Also, as under Minnesota Statutes section 559.213, 
an affidavit reciting the cancellation and the failure to respond is 
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.67  Finally, injunctive 
relief under Minnesota Statutes section 559.211 may be obtained by 
the party served.68  Such action may be commenced by service on 
 
 63. Id. subds. 4(b)-(c). 
 64. Id. subds. 3(b), 4(b) (requiring that notice under both cancellation with 
right to cure and declaratory cancellation must be served in the manner provided 
in section 559.21, subdivisions 4(a) and (b)). 
 65. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 3 (2002) with MINN. STAT. § 559.217, 
subd. 5.  Although cancellation with right to cure under section 559.217, 
subdivision 3(a)(3), requires that the notice state the purchase agreement will be 
cancelled unless the party served “complies with the conditions in default and 
completes the unfulfilled conditions,” the corresponding cancellation with right to 
cure notice under section 559.217, subdivision 5(a), only references the buyer 
having “fully complied with all of your obligations under the purchase agreement” 
and does not reference completing the unfulfilled conditions.  MINN. STAT. § 
559.217, subds. 3, 5. 
 66. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(d) with MINN. STAT. § 559.217, 
subds. 3(c), 4(c). 
 67. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.213 with MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 7(a)-
(c). 
 68. The statute authorizing issuance of an injunction staying a notice of 
termination, Minnesota Statutes section 559.211, subdivision 1, which was not 
amended by the 2004 legislation, provides that a court has authority to enjoin or 
restrain proceedings to effectuate a termination of a contract for the conveyance 
of real estate “notwithstanding the service or publication pursuant to the 
provisions of section 559.21 of a notice of termination of the contract” and does 
not mention section 559.217.  MINN. STAT. § 559.211, subd. 1 (2002).  The absence 
of any reference to section 559.217 in the injunction statute should probably not 
16
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the attorney for the party serving the cancellation.69 
However, the new cancellation procedures vary from section 
559.21 in important respects.  Obviously, the fifteen-day period is 
half the typical thirty-day period under a section 559.21 purchase 
agreement termination.70  Also, in a provision not found in the 
injunction statute applicable to section 559.21 terminations, if an 
injunctive action to suspend the cancellation under either of these 
new proceedings is brought, the court “shall” award filing fees, 
service costs, and attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in an 
amount not to exceed $3,000.71  In addition, upon completion of a 
cancellation under the new procedures, earnest money expressly 
becomes the property of the party initiating the cancellation and a 
broker is expressly authorized to release the money to that party 
upon receipt of an affidavit regarding the completed cancellation 
proceeding.72  Furthermore, unlike section 559.21, which is only 
available in the event of a default, the new procedures are also 
available when there is merely a failure to timely satisfy a 
condition.73  Finally, and perhaps most significantly, unlike section 
559.21, which is only available to a seller, the new cancellation 
procedures may be used (and notice initiated) by either a buyer or 
a seller.74 
D. Counter-Cancellations 
Due to this final variation, allowing for initiation of 
 
be read as precluding the application of the injunction statute to section 559.217 
proceedings because (a) section 559.211 applies to any “contract for the 
conveyance of real estate;” (b) section 559.217, subdivision 6, which authorizes an 
award of attorneys fees and costs in connection with any proceeding “to suspend 
the cancellation of a purchase agreement” under section 559.217, clearly envisions 
that a proceeding under section 559.217 may be suspended or enjoined in the 
manner provided in section 559.211; and (c) section 559.217, subdivision 8, 
authorizes service of process on the attorney initiating the cancellation in 
connection with an action to “restrain the cancellation.”  See MINN. STAT. §§ 559.21, 
.211, subd. 1, .217.  It is noteworthy that, even if section 559.211 applies to a section 
559.217 proceeding, section 559.211 seems to contemplate an injunction sought 
by a buyer against the seller, but does not appear to contemplate an action by a 
seller to enjoin a cancellation by a buyer under section 559.217 (which has no 
counterpart under section 559.21).  See MINN. STAT. § 559.211.   
 69. Compare MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 8 with MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 8. 
 70. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 3-4.   
 71. Id. subd. 6. 
 72. Id. subd. 7(d). 
 73. Id. subds. 3(a), 4(a). 
 74. Id. subd. 2. 
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cancellation by either a seller or a buyer, the legislation of necessity 
addresses the situation where both parties initiate cancellation by 
serving the other with notice, that is, dueling cancellations.75  Thus, 
when one party is served with a notice of cancellation under either 
procedure, if the served party serves a counter-cancellation within 
the time period allowed by the first cancellation, the effect of the 
second service is to automatically and immediately cancel the 
purchase agreement.76  In such event, the broker holding the 
earnest money has no authority to disburse the proceeds and the 
issue of who is entitled to the earnest money must be decided in a 
judicial action.77 
In such a proceeding following a counter-cancellation, the 
court is authorized to make a determination without regard to 
which party first initiated a cancellation proceeding.78  In addition, 
the court is granted express authority to “consider the terms of the 
cancelled purchase agreement in making its determination.”79  This 
last provision is significant given the longstanding rule in 
Minnesota that statutory cancellation of a contract removes any 
claim that a buyer otherwise might assert to recover payments made 
under the contract and that the parties are, in effect, placed in the 
position as if the contract had never existed in the first place.80  
Despite the fact that counter-cancellation will have the effect of 
cancelling the purchase agreement, the legislation specifically 
overrides this prior case law that would have precluded the court 
 
 75. The initial proposed legislation did not address the situation where a 
second party serves a section 559.217 notice after the first party does so.  H.F. 
2439, 83rd Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2004); S.F. 2379, 83rd Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2004).  
Application of the rule that the party who initiates and completes a cancellation is 
entitled to the earnest money to the situation of competing cancellation 
proceedings by both the seller and the buyer would, however, inevitably place 
conflicting obligations on the holder of the earnest money to tender the earnest 
money to both parties.  The bill was subsequently amended to address competing 
cancellations and provide for special rules in such a case.  See S. Journal, 83rd Leg. 
Sess., at 3052-53 (Minn. Mar. 25, 2004) (adopting amendments to S.F. 2379). 
 76. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 2.  An affidavit regarding the service of the 
two cancellations is prima facie evidence of the cancellation of the purchase 
agreement.  Id. subd. 7(e). 
 77. Id. subd.  2. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 218, 101 N.W.2d 213, 224 
(1960); Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 355, 180 N.W. 227, 
228 (1920); Olson v. N. Pac. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 229, 233-34, 148 N.W. 67, 69 
(1914); Nowicki v. Benson Prop., 402 N.W.2d 205, 208 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) 
(holding that breach of contract claim is not allowed after statutory cancellation). 
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from considering the terms of the cancelled purchase agreement in 
making its determination of who is entitled to the earnest money. 
III. ROMAIN  AND THE NEW LEGISLATION 
The distinction in the two new procedures between a purchase 
agreement which does or does not cancel “by its terms” is not, on 
its face, the same as the Romain test under section 559.21.  Under 
Romain, the issue is whether the agreement is definite and non-
contingent, and if so, statutory termination under section 559.21 is 
required notwithstanding the fact that the contract purports to 
automatically terminate by its own terms upon the buyer’s default.81 
It should be noted at the outset that the new legislation does 
provide for cancellation procedures for purchase agreements 
which would clearly not meet the Romain test, that is, would not 
require statutory termination under section 559.21.82  Declaratory 
cancellation will typically apply where, due to failure to satisfy a 
condition, such as financing or inspection, the agreement is 
automatically cancelled “by the terms of the purchase agreement.”83  
Such a contingent agreement would not meet the Romain test and, 
due to the absence of any default, could not be terminated under 
section 559.21 by a seller.  Declaratory cancellation would, however, 
allow either a seller or a buyer to initiate a proceeding to confirm 
such cancellation and, upon completion, have a means of 
evidencing such cancellation and the right to the earnest money.84 
In addition, cancellation with right to cure also applies to a 
purchase agreement which has failed due to failure of a condition 
but does not “by its terms” automatically cancel.85  Such a 
contingent purchase agreement would also not meet the Romain 
test requiring statutory termination and, due to the absence of any 
default, would not be terminable by the seller under section 
559.21.86  Such a contract can now, however, be cancelled by either 
the seller or the buyer under the new cancellation with right to 
cure procedure.87  Use of cancellation with right to cure for a 
 
 81. See Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Minn. 
1981). 
 82. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. subd. 3(a). 
 86. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002). 
 87. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 3(a). 
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contingent purchase agreement is likely to arise in situations where 
there is a contingency, but, usually due to poor drafting, the parties 
have failed to set out the consequences of the failure to fulfill (or 
waive) that contingency—that the agreement is to become null and 
void.88  Thus, with respect to both cancellation with right to cure 
and declaratory cancellation, the new legislation provides for 
cancellation procedures for a purchase agreement that not only 
would not need to be cancelled under Romain, but, in fact, could 
not be cancelled under section 559.21 due to the absence of a 
default. 
In addition to dealing with non-Romain purchase agreements, 
the new legislation purports to permit declaratory cancellation, 
that is, confirmation of cancellation without a right to cure, if a 
default occurs “which by the terms of the purchase agreement cancels the 
purchase agreement.”89 Does the new legislation validate 
declaratory cancellation, without an opportunity to cure after 
notice, of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement, despite 
the fact that under Romain, notice and an opportunity to cure 
under section 559.21 would be required?  In other words, can an 
ipso facto clause declaring that a purchase agreement becomes null 
and void automatically upon a default by the buyer (or seller) be 
enforced as written? 
The new legislation would arguably appear to recognize the 
declaratory cancellation of a residential purchase agreement by 
means of an ipso facto clause which provides that on default 
(presumably by the buyer), the purchase agreement is 
automatically null and void.  The new legislation does not 
reference the Romain test of definiteness and absence of 
contingencies.  Moreover, its express distinction between purchase 
agreements which do or do not cancel by their terms is arguably 
inconsistent with the teaching of Romain that section 559.21 “is not 
dependent on how the parties may have manipulated the contract 
language.”90  Furthermore, Romain is, strictly speaking, an 
interpretation of, or gloss on, section 559.21, not a pronouncement 
of the pure common law.  As such, its continued applicability is 
 
 88. Careful evaluation in such situation should be made of the need to do a 
cancellation with right to cure, however, since in contrast to declaratory 
cancellation, the former procedure will permit the served party a fifteen-day 
period to satisfy the condition after the date specified for fulfillment. 
 89. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a) (emphasis added). 
 90. Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Minn. 1981). 
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entirely within the control of the legislature and the legislature 
could, if it wished, overrule or limit Romain.  Under that theory, the 
new legislation, in effect, has declared Romain inapplicable and 
permits ipso facto termination clauses for default in definite, non-
contingent, residential purchase agreements confirmed by a 
declaratory cancellation. 
Nevertheless, there are strong indications that the new 
legislation did not intend to change the teachings of Romain and 
permit the declaratory cancellation of definite, non-contingent 
residential purchase agreements immediately upon a default 
without notice and opportunity to cure.  First, the existing 
termination statute, section 559.21, subdivision 4(a), including its 
prohibition on any waiver of the notice required by section 559.21, 
was amended by the 2004 law to read as follows: 
The notice required by the section must be given 
notwithstanding any provisions in the contract to the 
contrary, except that earnest money contracts, purchase 
agreements, and exercised options that are subject to this 
section may . . . be terminated on 30 days’ notice, or may be 
cancelled under section 559.217.91 
As previously noted, the reference to contracts “that are 
subject to this section” is the language previously adopted by the 
legislature to reflect and incorporate the Romain test.92  The 
continued use of that phrase with reference to purchase 
agreements that “may be cancelled under section 559.217”93 
indicates that the adoption of section 559.217 was not intended to 
repeal or nullify Romain. 
Also, the allowance of cancellation under section 559.217 is 
deemed another alternative to the sixty-day termination under 
section 559.21, just like the shortened thirty-day notice period for 
purchase agreements terminated under section 559.21.  Under that 
view, just as the Romain rule and the prohibition of contractual 
waiver of notice and cure rights are to be applied in the case of 
definite, non-contingent purchase agreements terminated under 
section 559.21, Romain and the prohibition of contractual waiver of 
notice and cure rights are to be applied to cancellation of definite, 
non-contingent residential purchase agreements under section 
559.217. 
 
 91. 2004 Minn. Laws ch. 203, § 9 (emphasis added). 
 92. See id. 
 93. Id. 
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Second, “purchase agreements” under section 559.217 are 
defined as those instruments “that could be cancelled under” 
section 559.21, providing a further basis to conclude that the new 
legislation did not intend to reject the Romain rule as it applied to 
cancellations under section 559.217.94 
Third, if the new legislation intended to make Romain 
inapplicable to the new procedures, it does not seem that it would 
have distinguished, as Romain does, between purchase agreements 
in which notice and right to cure are required, for which 
cancellation with right to cure must be used, and those purchase 
agreements in which no right to cure is required and for which 
declaratory cancellation can be used.95  In fact, as discussed more 
fully infra, the distinction between purchase agreements which do 
cancel by their own terms and purchase agreements which do not 
cancel by their own terms is largely only explicable with reference 
to Romain.96  Purchase agreements which do cancel by their own 
terms do so because Romain does not require otherwise.97  Purchase 
agreements which do not cancel by their own terms, however, do 
not cancel not because the contract terms state they do not cancel, 
but because of the extra-contractual, legal doctrine known as 
Romain.98  Romain dictates that such definite, non-contingent 
purchase agreements cannot cancel upon default without resort to 
the statutory cancellation procedure.99  Since the very distinction 
between purchase agreements that must be cancelled with a right 
to cure and purchase agreements for which declaratory 
cancellation applies is itself largely premised on the ongoing 
existence of the Romain doctrine, it makes little sense that the new 
legislation would intend to overrule Romain. 
Fourth, the conclusion that the legislature has rejected Romain 
would have serious implications for the ancient doctrine of 
equitable conversion.100  Under the doctrine of equitable 
 
 94. MINN. STAT. §§ 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002), 559.217, subd. 1(b).   Those 
limitations cannot, however, be read too literally since, as noted supra, contingent 
purchase agreements failing by reason of unfulfilled promises are not subject to 
section 559.21 and could not be cancelled under section 559.21, but can be the 
subject of both declaratory cancellation and cancellation with right to cure.  
 95. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 3, 4. 
 96. See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text.   
 97. See Romain v. Pebble Creek Partners, 310 N.W.2d 118, 122-23 (Minn. 
1981). 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.   
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conversion, a buyer under a definite, non-contingent purchase 
agreement will have acquired a property interest.  If declaratory 
cancellation is read as recognizing confirmation of the cancellation 
by means of an ipso facto default clause, without notice and right to 
cure, in the case of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement, 
the equitable conversion doctrine has been eviscerated beyond 
recognition. 
Fifth, as the Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized, the 
predecessor to section 559.21 was adopted a hundred years ago in 
“[r]eaction against the common-law rule permitting forfeiture 
without notice” and to “ameliorate the harsh rule of the common 
law.”101  It would make little sense to read the new legislation as 
reinstating the harsh situation under the common law that section 
559.21 was adopted to ameliorate over a hundred years ago.   
Finally, because Romain clearly still applies to non-residential 
purchase agreements which still must be terminated under section 
559.21, it makes little sense that the legislature intended that 
buyers under definite, non-contingent residential purchase 
agreements have less protection than the typically more 
sophisticated buyers (including developers) under similar non-
residential purchase agreements. 
Based upon this analysis, while the matter is not free from 
doubt, it appears that Romain remains applicable to the new 
legislation and declaratory cancellation only provides a means of 
confirming a cancellation which, under Romain, has otherwise 
taken effect.  In other words, the new legislation should be read to 
provide that only in the case of contingent or indefinite purchase 
agreements should ipso facto cancellations (based upon default or 
otherwise) be recognized under declaratory cancellation.  
Conversely, declaratory cancellation does not validate cancellation 
without an opportunity to cure a definite, non-contingent purchase 
agreement, even if the contract purports, by its own express terms, 
to provide for immediate, automatic cancellation upon a default.  
As a result, under this view of the new legislation, only cancellation 
with right to cure can be used upon a default to cancel a definite, 
non-contingent residential purchase agreement.  These 
conclusions should apply to cancellation by a buyer, as well as a 
seller, of a definite, non-contingent purchase agreement, 
 
 101. Jandric v. Skahen, 235 Minn. 256, 260, 50 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1951) 
(quoting Graceville State Bank. v. Hofschild, 166 Minn. 58, 62, 206 N.W. 948, 949 
(1926)). 
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notwithstanding any automatic default clause. 
IV. CANCELLATION “BY ITS TERMS” BASED UPON AN UNFUFILLED 
CONDITION 
As previously outlined, section 559.217 should be read, 
consistent with Romain, to provide that a definite, non-contingent 
purchase agreement does not cancel “by its terms” upon a default 
and, in such a case, cancellation with right to cure is required.  
There is, however, a separate, albeit related, issue regarding the 
application of declaratory cancellation in the case of unfulfilled 
conditions.  Specifically, what does it mean for a contingent 
purchase agreement to be cancelled “by its terms”? 
As previously noted, the difference between declaratory 
cancellation and cancellation with right to cure in the context of an 
unfulfilled condition is that the former applies if the existence of 
the unfulfilled condition cancels the purchase agreement “by the 
terms of the purchase agreement”102 and the latter applies if the 
existence of the unfulfilled condition “does not by its terms” cancel 
the purchase agreement.103  The legislation itself does not provide 
any real guidance on what provisions in a purchase agreement 
qualify the purchase agreement for declaratory cancellation. 
One purchase agreement would appear to clearly qualify for 
declaratory cancellation had it been subject to the new statute—
that is the purchase agreement involved in Romain.104  That 
purchase agreement provided that if the parties were unable to 
agree upon collateral for the buyer’s obligation satisfactory to the 
seller, the purchase agreement would be null and void.105  Since the 
parties were unable to agree on that collateral, the purchase 
agreement became null and void “by the terms of the purchase 
agreement.”106  As a result, had the contract in Romain involved 
residential property and been entered into after August 1, 2004, 
either seller or buyer could have commenced a declaratory 
cancellation proceeding under section 559.217 to confirm that the 
agreement had, in fact, been cancelled.  Beyond that case, however, 
it is less clear the reach of declaratory cancellation.   
Purchase agreements frequently provide that a party has the 
 
 102. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a). 
 103. Id. subd. 3(a). 
 104. See Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 119. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
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right or option to cancel (or declare a cancellation of) the 
purchase agreement upon some event, for example, failure to 
procure financing or failure to evidence good title.  Upon exercise 
of that right or option by that party, the purchase agreement is 
cancelled (or null and void).  One might argue that because the 
“terms” of such purchase agreement purport to provide that the 
purchase agreement is “cancelled,” such a purchase agreement 
cancels “by its terms” and hence, qualifies for declaratory 
cancellation.  The problem with that approach is twofold. 
First, if the test of whether a purchase agreement does or does 
not cancel “by its terms” is whether the purchase agreement is 
cancelable, that is, the seller or the buyer has the right to cancel 
(or declare the purchase agreement cancelled or declare the 
purchase agreement null and void), virtually all purchase 
agreement conditions will satisfy that test.  Only a purchase 
agreement containing the most poorly drafted contingency 
provision will not cancel “by its terms”—one which does not 
indicate that upon the happening (or non-happening) of such 
contingency, one or both of the parties has the right to cancel the 
purchase agreement.  Thus, if grant of a right to cancel means that 
a purchase agreement cancels “by the terms of the purchase 
agreement,” few purchase agreements will not qualify. 
Second, the statutory language for declaratory cancellation 
refers to the situation where an “unfulfilled condition exists . . . in 
the terms of a purchase agreement . . . which by the terms of the 
purchase agreement cancels the purchase agreement.”107  Although 
the word “which” follows “purchase agreement,” the reference is to 
the fact that an “unfulfilled condition exists.”108  In other words, it is 
the existence of the unfulfilled condition that is causing the 
cancellation of the purchase agreement.109  If it is the mere 
existence of the unfulfilled condition that must cause the 
cancellation of the purchase agreement, then it is hard to say that a 
purchase agreement which gives the buyer or seller the right or 
option to terminate the purchase agreement qualifies for 
 
 107. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4(a).  The counterpart language for a 
cancellation with right to cure similarly refers to the situation where an 
“unfulfilled condition exists . . . in the terms of a purchase agreement . . . which 
does not by its terms cancel the purchase agreement.”  Id. subd. 3(a). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Also, it would not make linguistic sense to say that it is the purchase 
agreement “which by the terms of the purchase agreement cancels the purchase 
agreement.” 
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declaratory cancellation.  The reference to cancellation “by its 
terms” or “by the terms of the purchase agreement” suggests that it 
must be the terms of the purchase agreement themselves that 
effectuate the cancellation and not any action or election of the 
seller or buyer.110 
In that view, it is the existence of the unfulfilled condition, not 
the election of the party to cancel (or declare a cancellation), that 
causes the purchase agreement to cancel by its own terms.  Thus, 
under this interpretation, it is only a condition that automatically, 
ipso facto, causes the termination of the purchase agreement that 
meets the declaratory cancellation test.  Under that construction, 
only if the unfulfilled condition automatically cancels the purchase 
agreement, without the need for any action or election by the seller 
or buyer, will the purchase agreement qualify for declaratory 
cancellation.111 
The real problem is that the whole distinction between 
purchase agreements which do or do not cancel by their own terms 
is that such a distinction is not one familiar to modern Minnesota 
real estate law with one notable exception.  The substantive rights 
of the parties have generally not been affected by whether the 
“terms” of a purchase agreement do or do not provide that the 
purchase agreement cancels or is terminated “by its terms” upon a 
default or an unfulfilled condition.  As noted supra, the distinction 
between purchase agreements which do or do not terminate by 
their “terms” is not a function of the precise language in the 
purchase agreements and whether or not they expressly state that 
upon a default or upon the non-occurrence of a particular 
condition, the purchase agreement will cancel, terminate, or 
become null and void.112  Rather, in Minnesota the distinction is 
really only a function of the applicability of an extra-contractual 
legal doctrine, Romain.113  Romain provides that, regardless of 
 
 110. It is noteworthy that all the purchase agreements in the cases cited in 
Romain, both those involving defaults to which section 559.21 was held to apply 
and those involving contingencies to which section 559.21 was held not to apply, 
all contained automatic, ipso facto termination provisions.  Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 
121-22. 
 111. If only an automatic, ipso facto cancellation qualifies for declaratory 
cancellation, then a clause which provided for automatic cancellation, but with a 
provision that such cancellation may be avoided or waived by the election of one 
of the parties, would not appear to qualify because it is functionally equivalent to a 
right to cancel (or declare a cancellation) upon the contingency. 
 112. See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying text.    
 113. Romain, 310 N.W.2d 118. 
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whether the particular “terms” of a purchase agreement purport to 
automatically cancel the purchase agreement upon a default, a 
definite, non-contingent purchase agreement will not cancel “by its 
terms” but will require cancellation pursuant to the statutory 
cancellation procedure.114  In other words, whether a purchase 
agreement cancels “by its terms” is not dependent on the terms of 
the purchase agreement and what it says about cancellation, but 
the application of the Romain doctrine to the purchase agreement 
as a whole.115 
By drawing the distinction based upon the applicability of an 
extra-contractual doctrine, section 559.217 paradoxically applies an 
analysis of a purchase agreement based upon the effect that 
another statute, section 559.21, would have on a particular 
purchase agreement, despite the fact that section 559.217 is an 
alternative to section 559.21 and the particular purchase 
agreement is not being terminated under section 559.21.  This 
conceptual difficulty is further complicated by the fact that both 
cancellation with right to cure and declaratory cancellation under 
section 559.217 are available in the case of cancellation by reason 
of an unfulfilled condition.  The new legislation draws the 
distinction between purchase agreements which do or do not 
cancel by their own “terms” as a result of an unfulfilled condition.116  
Yet the Romain doctrine has absolutely no applicability to 
contingent purchase agreements and so it is hard to see how 
Romain can provide any guidance on that score. 
Thus, the whole distinction between purchase agreements 
which do or do not cancel by their own “terms” may be 
theoretically suspect.  On the one hand, it is hard to place much 
weight on the distinction of whether a purchase agreement 
automatically does or does not cancel without an election by one of 
the parties.  Whether the cancellation is automatic or whether a 
party must elect to cancel would not appear to justify disparate 
treatment under section 559.217.  On the other hand, the Romain 
doctrine provides no traction in analyzing the distinction between 
self-cancelling and non-self-cancelling agreements in the context of 
unfulfilled conditions. 
 
 114. Id.  
 115. In Romain, the court, in discussing the contingent purchase agreement in 
Joslyn v. Schwend, 85 Minn. 130, 88 N.W. 410 (1901), noted that in that case the 
purchase agreement ended “by its terms.”  Romain, 310 N.W.2d at 121. 
 116. MINN. STAT. § 559.217 (2004).   
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The recently revised residential purchase agreement form 
adopted by the Minnesota Association of Realtors provides some 
instruction on this point.117  The realtors’ form is very commonly 
used in Minnesota residential transactions and almost always used 
where a broker is involved.118  The purchase agreement form 
attempts to address the issue of when declaratory cancellation may 
be used.  The default provision, revised to reflect section 559.217, 
provides as follows: 
[I]f either Buyer or Seller defaults in any of the 
agreements hereunder or there exists an unfulfilled 
condition after the date specified for fulfillment, either 
party may cancel this Purchase Agreement under MN 
Statute 559.217, Subd. 3.  Whenever it is provided herein 
that the Purchase Agreement is cancelled, said language 
shall be deemed a provision authorizing a Declaratory 
Cancellation under MN Statute 559.217, Subd. 4.119 
Thus, this form indicates that the parties are to use cancellation 
with right to cure in any case where there is a default or unfulfilled 
condition, but declaratory cancellation can be used only where the 
agreement provides that the agreement “is cancelled.” 120 
From this language one might speculate that this form 
purchase agreement draws a distinction between situations where 
cancellation is at the option of one of the parties, in which case 
cancellation with right to cure must be used, and situations where 
upon the happening or non-happening of an event, cancellation 
occurs automatically without any election or option of the parties 
(“is cancelled”), in which case declaratory cancellation may be 
used.  In fact, a number of provisions in this form purchase 
agreement provide that, upon the non-fulfillment of a condition, 
the purchase agreement “is cancelled” automatically, without either 
party exercising any option or election.  Thus, if the condition is 
not timely fulfilled, the form provides that the purchase agreement 
“is cancelled” without any requirement that either party exercise 
any election or option.121  This requirement is found in the 
provision dealing with cancellation of a previously written purchase 
agreement (with a third party buyer),122 under the Contingency 
 
 117. See MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004). 
 118. Id.   
 119. Id. at lines 116-119 (emphasis added). 
 120. See id. 
 121. See infra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.   
 122. See MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 
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Addendum dealing with buyer’s sale of his existing residence,123 in 
one of the formulations of the Financing Addendum,124  and in one 
of the provisions dealing with the buyer’s inspection contingency.125    
However, a second group of provisions in the purchase 
agreement form, dealing with conditions, provides that non-
fulfillment of a condition of the purchase agreement does not 
result in cancellation of the purchase agreement unless and until 
one of the parties elects to cancel.126  Yet, even though the 
purported cancellation is not automatic, the form still recites that 
the purchase agreement is cancelled.127  Thus, in the provision 
dealing with post-agreement special assessments,128 in the provision 
dealing with the inability of the seller to provide marketable title,129 
in the provision addressing a casualty loss,130 in another formulation 
of the financing contingency,131 and in another provision dealing 
with the buyer’s inspection contingency,132 non-fulfillment of the 
 
32-35.  If cancellation of the prior purchase agreement with a third party is not 
obtained by the specified date, the subject purchase agreement “is cancelled.”  Id. 
 123. See MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519N: CONTINGENCY ADDENDUM (2004), 
lines 12-13, 17-18.  If the buyer fails to enter into a purchase agreement for an 
existing residence by a specified date (or provide satisfactory evidence to the seller 
of the buyer’s ability to close the purchase without the sale of the buyer’s 
property), the subject purchase agreement “is cancelled.”  Id. 
 124. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519B: FINANCING ADDENDUM CONVENTIONAL OR 
PRIVATELY INSURED CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE (2004), line 16.  If the buyer cannot 
secure a financing commitment, the purchase agreement “is cancelled.”  Id. 
 125. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519INSP: INSPECTION CONTINGENCY ADDENDUM 
(2004), lines 32-34.  If, after conducting an inspection, the buyer notifies the seller 
of defects and the parties have not agreed on who will do or pay for repairs, the 
purchase agreement “is cancelled without further notice required.”  Id. 
 126. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.   
 127. See infra notes 128-132 and accompanying text.   
 128. MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 58-
62.  If a notice of special assessment is received after entering into the purchase 
agreement, either party “may” declare the purchase agreement cancelled, in 
which case the purchase agreement “is cancelled.”  Id. 
 129. Id. at lines 82-84.  If the seller cannot provide marketable title, either 
party “may” declare the purchase agreement cancelled by notice, in which case the 
purchase agreement “is cancelled.”  Id. 
 130. Id. at lines 102-104.  If there is a casualty destroying or substantially 
damaging the property, the purchase agreement, “is cancelled, at Buyer’s option.”  
Id. 
 131. MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519B: FINANCING ADDENDUM CONVENTIONAL OR 
PRIVATELY INSURED CONVENTIONAL MORTGAGE (2004), lines 21-25, 32-36.  If the 
buyer fails to provide evidence of financing by a specified date or if the agreement 
does not close for any reason relating to financing, the seller “may, at Seller’s 
option” declare the purchase agreement cancelled, in which case the purchase 
agreement “is cancelled.”  Id.  
 132. MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519INSP: INSPECTION CONTINGENCY ADDENDUM  
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condition does not automatically result in any consequences.  
Rather, upon the election or option by one of the parties (along 
with notice to the other party) following the non-fulfillment of the 
condition, the form provides that the purchase agreement is 
cancelled.133  By using the code words “is cancelled,” the realtor’s 
form contemplates the use of declaratory cancellation even though 
cancellation only results from the option or election of one of the 
parties. 
The theory of the realtor’s purchase agreement form appears 
to be that as long as the purchase agreement expressly states that in 
a particular circumstance the agreement “is cancelled,” then it is 
cancelled “by the terms of the purchase agreement” within the 
meaning of section 559.217, subdivision 4, so as to qualify for 
declaratory cancellation.134  This seems a questionable theory since, 
under this approach, one could, contrary to Romain, draft a clause 
which provides that upon any default the purchase agreement “is 
cancelled” so as to permit declaratory cancellation of a non-
contingent purchase agreement without any cure period.135  
Moreover, this self-defining approach elevates form (use of the 
code words “is cancelled”) over substance (the legal analysis of 
whether the agreement, in fact, cancels “by the terms of the 
purchase agreement”).  In fact, it is tautological since, according to 
this approach, an agreement cancels “by the terms of the purchase 
agreement” under a particular circumstance if the agreement states 
that it is cancelling by the terms of the purchase agreement (by use 
of the code words “is cancelled”).136  Nevertheless, given the 
conceptual difficulty of ever articulating the theoretical 
prerequisites for declaratory cancellation under the statute, there is 
a reasonable likelihood that a court would accept the approach of 
the realtor’s form and permit declaratory cancellation where the 
 
(2004), lines 43-45.  Notwithstanding any other provision, the buyer may cancel 
the purchase agreement within a specified time after the inspection by notice, in 
which case the purchase agreement “is cancelled.”  Id. 
 133. See supra notes 126-132 and accompanying text. 
 134. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 4 (2004). 
 135. The default section of the realtor’s form only authorizes termination 
under section 559.21 or cancellation under section 559.217, subdivision 3, upon a 
default and does not authorize declaratory cancellation upon a default.  
MILLER/DAVIS Co., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 115-118. 
 136. Put another way, this theory contends that one of the “terms” of the 
purchase agreement is the cancellation of the purchase agreement upon a 
particular occurrence or non-occurrence, and therefore, the purchase agreement, 
itself, cancels “by its terms.” 
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form purchase agreement provides that the agreement cancels “by 
its terms.” 
 
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE NEW LEGISLATION 
 
A. Section 559.21 and Residential Purchase Agreements 
 
The two new procedures are alternatives to section 559.21 so 
that termination under section 559.21 of a residential purchase 
agreement is still available, albeit only for a disgruntled seller.137  
Section 559.21 obviously has certain drawbacks for a seller in 
comparison to the new procedures: it has a minimum thirty-day 
cure period and cannot be used in the event of a mere failure of a 
condition; it can only be based upon buyer default.138  Section 
559.21 does provide for a payment of the seller’s attorneys’ fees as a 
condition to the buyer’s cure, but the amount is limited and can 
only be claimed if the buyer has been in default for at least thirty 
days prior to the service of the notice,139 a delay in the ability to 
commence a statutory termination is a delay that most purchase 
agreement sellers are unwilling to endure. 
The provisions of section 559.217 dealing with the effect of a 
counter-cancellation are not applicable to a section 559.21 notice, 
and, therefore, the legislation does not authorize or envision a 
counter-cancellation to a section 559.21 notice.  Nevertheless, while 
it is not clear, it appears that a buyer served with a section 559.21 
notice can, within the thirty-day section 559.21 notice period, serve 
and effectuate a fifteen-day section 559.217 initial cancellation, 
despite the pendency of the section 559.21 notice.  In Liebsch v. 
Abbott,140 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that a section 559.21 
cancellation was ineffective as against a buyer who had previously 
rescinded the contract (by written notice to the seller).141  
 
 137. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(a) (2002).  The newly-revised residential 
purchase agreement promulgated by the Minnesota Association of Realtors 
specifically recognizes that a seller can still use section 559.21 upon a buyer’s 
default.  MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 115-
116. 
 138. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21.  As a result, if there is a failure of a condition and 
the seller wishes to use section 559.21, the seller must wait until the buyer fails to 
come to the closing before declaring a default and initiating a section 559.21 
termination.  See id.   
 139. Id.  subd. 2a(5). 
 140. 265 Minn. 447, 122 N.W.2d 578 (1963). 
 141. Id. at 452-54, 582-83. 
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Therefore, if the buyer’s fifteen-day section 559.217 notice runs 
and is effectuated prior to the running of the seller’s thirty-day 
section 559.21 notice, the seller’s section 559.21 notice will be a 
nullity (without the buyer needing to obtain an injunction) 
because, prior to the running of the thirty-day period under the 
seller’s section 559.21 notice, the buyer will have already cancelled 
the purchase agreement.  As the Minnesota Supreme Court has 
noted, “Once rescinded, the contract [is] at an end and [can] not 
be cancelled by statutory or any other kind of notice.”142 
What can the seller who has already initiated the section 
559.21 procedure do?  Immediately after service of the buyer’s 
section 559.217 notice, the seller might first withdraw the section 
559.21 notice.143  Thereafter, the seller could serve a section 
559.217 notice so as to counter the buyer’s section 559.217 notice, 
which would have the effect of defeating the buyer’s section 
559.217 proceeding (while still terminating the contract).144  Such a 
technique might prevent a seller who has served a section 559.21 
notice from being pre-empted by a buyer’s later section 559.217 
notice.  Given the longer notice period under section 559.21, 
however, it is probably inadvisable for a seller under a residential 
purchase agreement to use section 559.21.  The safest course for a 
seller faced with a defaulting buyer would be to serve the shorter 
section 559.217 notice in the first place.145 
 
 142. Blosick v. Warmbold, 151 Minn. 264, 268, 187 N.W. 136, 137 (1922), 
quoted in Liebsch v. Abbott, 265 Minn. at 456, 122 N.W.2d at 584-85. 
 143. Kosbau v. Dress, 400 N.W.2d 106, 109-10 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (holding 
that a seller can withdraw notice of cancellation during pendency of the cure 
period). 
 144. Although the statute does not address the issue, it would appear that 
service of a section 559.217 fifteen-day notice by a seller during the pendency of 
the seller’s section 559.21 thirty-day notice would not be effective and would, in 
fact, invalidate both notices on the grounds that that the buyer would be unduly 
confused as to his or her allowed cure period.  Under the theory that an 
understatement of the permitted time in the notice presumably dispirits a 
purchaser, the Minnesota Supreme Court has held that a notice indicating a thirty-
day time period was invalid where ninety days was required.  Tarpy v. Nowicki, 286 
Minn. 257, 263, 175 N.W.2d 443, 448 (1970).  Service of a fifteen-day notice 
during the pendency of a previously served thirty-day notice is likely to unfairly 
confuse a buyer and cause both notices to be ineffective. 
 145. Of course, in the case of a non-residential purchase agreement (not 
subject to the new legislation), section 559.21 is the only available remedy (albeit 
for sellers only) and considerations of a counter-cancellation by the buyer are not 
relevant. 
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B. No Proceeding 
In addition to a section 559.21 procedure, there is the 
alternative of not using any of the statutory proceedings.  
Declaratory cancellation is a safe harbor (and a means of capturing 
the earnest money), but, the new legislation does not appear to 
change prior law regarding when a purchase agreement terminates 
by its own terms without the need to provide the other party with 
notice and cure rights.  Therefore, in such a situation, neither a 
seller nor a buyer is required to initiate a confirmatory declaratory 
cancellation.  Rather, in the case of a residential purchase 
agreement where, due to lack of definiteness or contingencies, it is 
clear that it does not meet the Romain test and need not be 
terminated under section 559.21, a party may still simply rely on 
the language in the residential purchase agreement cancelling the 
transaction without using the declaratory cancellation procedure.146  
Of course, such party will not be able to rely on the imprinter of 
prima facie cancellation provided by declaratory cancellation, but 
such a benefit may not be worth the cost and time involved in 
serving the fifteen-day notice and the risk of triggering an action 
for an injunction commenced by the served party. 
VI. TRAP FOR THE BUYER 
There is a trap for the unwary buyer where a seller uses either 
of the two cancellation procedures based upon an unfulfilled 
condition.  Most residential purchase agreements provide, by their 
terms, that if the agreement is cancelled by reason of an unfulfilled 
condition, the earnest money is to be refunded to the buyer.  
However, the baseline rule under the new legislation is that upon a 
completed cancellation proceeding, the earnest money is the 
property of the party initiating the cancellation and the broker is to 
deliver the money to that initiator.147  Thus, where the seller 
 
 146. As noted supra, the form promulgated by the Minnesota Association of 
Realtors states that whenever the purchase agreement provides that, as a result of a 
failed condition, the purchase agreement “is cancelled,” it is to be “deemed a 
provision authorizing” declaratory cancellation under section 559.217.  
MILLER/DAVIS CO., FORM 1519A: PURCHASE AGREEMENT (2004), lines 118-119.  To 
the extent that language is read as requiring (as opposed to simply permitting) 
declaratory cancellation in the case of an unfulfilled condition, use of this form 
will eliminate the alternative of relying solely on the language of the purchase 
agreement and refraining from using any statutory proceeding. 
 147. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 7(d) (2004); see also supra note 72 and 
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commences either of the new cancellation proceedings based upon 
failure of a condition, unless the buyer enjoins the cancellation or 
serves a counter-cancellation notice (which would make the 
baseline earnest money rule ineffective), the seller will receive and 
be entitled to the earnest money upon completion of the 
cancellation, despite the clear language in the purchase agreement 
to the contrary.148  Since the purchase agreement will have been 
cancelled and of no force and effect, the buyer will not have any 
judicial recourse against the seller149 and the seller will receive a 
windfall. 
As a practical matter, when a transaction collapses due 
unequivocally to an unfulfilled condition of a buyer, sellers are 
generally willing to negotiate a cancellation agreement with, and 
refund the earnest money to, the buyer in order to remarket the 
house.  The refusal by the buyer in such circumstances would 
ordinarily be without justification so that a subsequent seller-
cancellation and forfeiture of the earnest money might not be 
unjust, especially since the buyer could defeat the forfeiture by a 
counter-cancellation.  However, under various circumstances, 
buyers may have good reasons not to sign a cancellation 
agreement. 
For example, if the purchase agreement is conditioned on the 
seller’s purchase of another home, and the seller claims that the 
condition has failed, but the buyer justifiably claims that the 
condition has been satisfied or waived, a buyer would be justified in 
not signing a cancellation agreement.  Similarly, the purchase 
agreement may be conditioned on the buyer’s sale of its existing 
residence or satisfactory evidence of the buyer’s financial ability to 
consummate the purchase without the sale of the existing 
residence.  If the seller unjustifiably claims that buyer’s evidence is 
unsatisfactory, the buyer would be within his right (and well-
advised) not to sign a cancellation agreement.  In both of those 
cases, however, the seller may choose to serve a declaratory 
cancellation notice on the buyer based upon the allegedly 
unfulfilled condition.  The buyer would be well-advised not to serve 
 
accompanying text.   
 148. See supra Part II.D.  
 149. See supra Part II.D.  Unlike counter-cancellations, where a court has 
authority to “consider the terms of the cancelled purchase agreement in making 
its determination,” as provided in section 559.217, subdivision 2, under this 
hypothetical, a court has no authority to consider a claim by an aggrieved buyer 
for earnest money payments made under the now-cancelled contract. 
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on the seller a counter-cancellation (even one based on the seller’s 
default, rather than failure of a condition), because, as discussed 
infra, service of the counter-cancellation would automatically 
terminate the purchase agreement and constitute an abandonment 
of the buyer’s claim for specific performance against the seller.150  
As a result, if the seller was to serve the declaratory cancellation 
notice, unless the buyer was to procure an injunction, by operation 
of the statute the seller will receive the earnest money, contrary to 
the express provision in the purchase agreement that if the 
purchase agreement is terminated by reason of the unfulfilled 
condition, the earnest money is to be refunded to the buyer. 
Even in the situation where it is uncontested by the parties that 
the purchase agreement has failed by reason of an unfulfilled 
condition, it is possible that a sharp-practicing seller might seize 
upon the failure of any condition to immediately commence a 
declaratory cancellation proceeding of the purchase agreement.  In 
all of these situations, unless the buyer seeks an injunction (or, in 
the last case, commences a counter-cancellation), an unjust 
outcome, albeit inherent in the statutory scheme, will result. 
There may be a similar trap for the seller in the situation 
(somewhat unusual in the residential context) where the purchase 
agreement provides that if the transaction does not close due to the 
failure of a condition, the earnest money is non-refundable to the 
buyer as compensation to the seller for taking the property off the 
market.  In such a case, if the condition is not fulfilled and the 
buyer initiates and completes a section 559.217 cancellation based 
upon the unfulfilled condition, by operation of the statute the 
purchase agreement will be conclusively cancelled and, despite the 
parties’ agreement to the contrary,  the earnest money will be 
refunded to the buyer.  In fact, in the situation where the purchase 
agreement provides for the seller’s retention of earnest money 
when the purchase agreement fails by reason of an unfulfilled 
condition, the statute may give the buyer an incentive not to sign a 
consensual termination.  Unlike the seller who normally has the 
incentive of remarketing the property, the buyer will have little to 
gain from a termination agreement which, as the seller will 
justifiably insist, provides for forfeiture of the earnest money to the 
seller in accordance with the terms of the purchase agreement.  
Rather, with nothing much to lose, the buyer may be willing to at 
 
 150. See infra Part VII.   
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least initiate a section 559.217 cancellation proceeding based upon 
the failed condition, which (absent an injunction or a seller 
counter-cancellation) will reap an undeserved windfall for the 
buyer.   
 These buyer-traps and seller-traps expose a problem in the 
underlying theory of section 559.217.  The statute presumes that 
the party initiating a cancellation proceeding is the wronged party 
to whom the earnest money belongs.  This theory makes sense in 
the context of a default where the non-defaulting party (either the 
seller or the buyer) initiates a section 559.217 cancellation 
proceeding upon the defaulting party and, upon completion of 
such uncontested (and uncountered) proceeding, the earnest 
money should be awarded to such non-defaulting party.  That, in 
fact, is consistent with the long-settled Minnesota case law to the 
effect that upon a seller’s completion of a section 559.21 
termination proceeding based upon a buyer’s default, all payments 
made by the buyer are forfeited to the seller, regardless of any 
contrary claims by the buyer.151    
In the situation of a failure of the purchase agreement due to 
an unfulfilled condition, however, section 559.217 does not rely on 
the wronged party to initiate a cancellation proceeding, but rather 
allows either the seller or the buyer to prosecute a cancellation 
proceeding regardless of to whom the express terms of the 
purchase agreement would award the earnest money.  Since 
neither seller nor buyer is really a wrongdoer in the situation of a 
failed condition, it may be merely happenstance that section 
559.217 awards the earnest money in accordance with the 
expectations of the parties, as reflected by the terms of the 
purchase agreement, or frustrates those settled expectations.  This, 
of course, is not a problem under section 559.21 since that statute 
is expressly limited to situations of buyer default and does not 
permit service of a termination notice merely based upon a failed 
condition.152   While a seller or buyer who would otherwise intend 
to commence a cancellation proceeding under section 559.217 in 
order to achieve a disposition of the earnest money contrary to the 
provisions of the purchase agreement may be somewhat deterred 
from doing so by reason of the possibility of counter-cancellation 
or the in terrorem effect of a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees if an 
 
 151. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 152. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (2002). 
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injunction is sought,153 the potential for wrongful windfalls is 
unavoidable.   
There is one possible caveat to this matter.  Financing 
contingency addendums for FHA and VA mortgages provide that if 
the subject property does not appraise for a minimum amount, the 
purchase agreement is automatically null and void and all earnest 
money must be refunded to the buyer.  Federal regulations with 
regard to VA-insured mortgages require that all purchase 
agreements to be financed by a VA mortgage contain a provision 
that reads substantially as follows: 
[N]otwithstanding any other provisions of this contract, 
the purchaser shall not incur any penalty by forfeiture of 
earnest money or otherwise or be obligated to complete 
the purchase of the property described herein, if the 
contract purchase price or cost exceeds [the VA-approved 
appraisal of] the reasonable value of the property.154 
Similarly, the federal housing requirements with regard to 
FHA-insured mortgages require the following clause in all purchase 
agreements to be financed by an FHA mortgage: 
[N]otwithstanding any other provisions of this contract, 
the purchaser shall not be obligated to complete the 
purchase of the property described herein or to incur any 
penalty by forfeiture of earnest money deposits or 
otherwise, unless the purchaser has been given [an 
appraisal of at least a specified amount].155 
If the conditions addressed in this clause are triggered, that is, 
the appraisal is too low, and a seller serves a notice, under either 
cancellation with right to cure or declaratory cancellation, and the 
allowed time period expires without action of the buyer, section 
559.217 dictates that the earnest money is the property of, and is to 
 
 153. MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subd. 6 (2004).  It would appear that a court, in 
the exercise of its equitable powers, should enjoin or restrain a section 559.217 
cancellation based upon an unfulfilled condition where the effect of the statutory 
proceeding, if not enjoined or restrained, would be to award the earnest money 
contrary to the terms of the purchase agreement.  In such a situation, the party 
seeking the injunction is likely to be deemed the “prevailing party” so as to be 
entitled to a mandatory award of attorneys’ fees and costs under section 559.217, 
subdivision 6.   Faced with the risk of such result, a party initiating the cancellation 
proceeding may decide to withdraw the cancellation notice once an injunction 
hearing has been scheduled.   
 154. 38 C.F.R. § 36.4303(k)(4) (2004). 
 155. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, MORTGAGE CREDIT 
ANALYSIS FOR MORTGAGE INSURANCE ON ONE TO FOUR FAMILY PROPERTIES, Handbook 
4155.1, rev. 5 §§ 3-4 (Oct. 2003). 
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be tendered to, the seller.156  However, federal law, in this case, will 
likely pre-empt contrary state law and require that the earnest 
money be the property of, and be tendered to, the buyer. 
VII. COUNTER-CANCELLATION 
As previously noted supra, while statutory termination by a 
buyer is not authorized under section 559.21, the potential of 
counter-cancellation under section 559.217 commenced by the 
party first served with a section 559.217 notice is an unavoidable 
result of the mutuality of the new remedies.157  Such a counter-
cancellation must be initiated by the served party prior to 
completion of the first cancellation and such second service does 
have the irrevocable effect of immediately cancelling the purchase 
agreement.158  While a party served with a section 559.217 notice 
might seek an injunction under section 559.211¸ a counter-
cancellation is far cheaper and easier to effectuate.  Preparation 
and service of a counter-cancellation notice requires far less legal 
effort and cost as compared to securing a temporary restraining 
order or a temporary injunction.  Furthermore, the counter-
cancellation, like an injunction, has the effect of frustrating the 
initial party’s efforts to procure a quick and easy means of securing 
the earnest money and requires the parties to seek judicial 
resolution of that issue.  Finally, unlike an effort to seek a 
temporary restraining order or a temporary injunction, which may 
or may not be successful, counter-cancellation always has the effect 
of frustrating the effort to procure the earnest money (of course, at 
the expense of surrendering any defense to cancellation of the 
purchase agreement). 
If a seller or a buyer initiates a proceeding under section 
559.217, whether it be cancellation with right to cure or declaratory 
cancellation, under what circumstances can the served party initiate 
a counter-cancellation?159  An examination of the various counter-
 
 156. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217. 
 157. See supra Part II.D. 
 158. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 2, 7(e). 
 159. While the choice between cancellation with right to cure and declaratory 
cancellation will depend on the situation, as long as some procedure is available to 
both the party who is the potential initiator of a procedure and to the party who 
potentially commences a counter-cancellation, it matters not which particular 
procedure is used because any counter-cancellation will trigger the counter-
cancellation rules under the new legislation.  See MINN. STAT. § 559.217, subds. 
2, 7(e). 
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cancellation scenarios is instructive.  While a purchase agreement 
transaction might fail for a myriad of reasons, essentially all those 
reasons can be classified as one of three categories: (1) buyer 
default, that is the buyer failed to close without justification (“Buyer 
Default”); (2) seller default, that is, the seller failed to close without 
justification (“Seller Default”); and (3) failure of a condition for 
the benefit of buyer, such as financing, inspection, land-use 
approvals, or failure of a condition for the benefit of the seller, 
such as purchase or sale of replacement property (“Contingency”). 
It is important to note in this regard that unless the served 
party resorts to injunctive relief under section 559.211,160 the 
contentions of the party commencing the section 559.217 
procedure will not be judicially tested.  Therefore, judicial 
affirmation is not required as a pre-condition for either an initial 
cancellation procedure or for a counter-cancellation. 
A seller may initiate a proceeding by reason of claims of Buyer 
Default or Contingency.  In response, the buyer could commence a 
counter-cancellation based upon a claim of Seller Default.  In 
addition, the buyer could also respond to a seller cancellation 
notice based upon Buyer Default or Contingency by a counter-
cancellation based upon that same (or another) Contingency.  In 
fact, as discussed supra, where a seller has initially commenced a 
proceeding based upon Contingency, a counter-cancellation by the 
buyer typically will be necessary to prevent the earnest money from 
being forfeited to the seller in contravention of the terms of the 
purchase agreement.161  Therefore, where a seller initiates a 
cancellation based upon Contingency, a buyer is normally justified 
in commencing a counter-cancellation based upon that 
Contingency under the theory that the earnest money should not 
become the property of the seller, but rather should be refunded 
to the buyer. 
A buyer may initiate a section 559.217 proceeding by reason of 
either claims of Seller Default or Contingency.162  In response, the 
seller could commence a counter-cancellation based upon a claim 
of Buyer Default.  It is more questionable whether such a seller 
could commence a counter-cancellation based solely upon a claim 
of Contingency.  The statute does not, on its face, preclude a 
counter-cancellation by a seller based upon Contingency in 
 
 160. MINN. STAT. § 559.211 (2002). 
 161. See supra Part II.D. 
 162. See MINN. STAT. § 559.217. 
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response to a prior proceeding commenced by the buyer based 
upon the same Contingency (or even Seller Default).163  If the 
purchase agreement has been terminated by its own terms as a 
result of the Contingency, the legislation permits declaratory 
cancellation and nothing in the new legislation restricts either 
party from initiating such proceeding (or commencing such 
proceeding to counter the notice from the other party).164  
However, as previously noted, most residential purchase 
agreements provide that upon failure of the Contingency, the 
earnest money is to be refunded to the buyer.  A counter-
cancellation by a seller, based solely upon Contingency in response 
to an initial cancellation by the buyer based upon Contingency (or 
Seller Default), has the sole purpose and effect of denying an 
immediate refund of the buyer’s earnest money.  As such, while a 
counter-cancellation by the seller may not be expressly precluded 
by the new legislation, it is clearly contrary to its spirit. 
Of course, if the served party does not dispute termination of 
the purchase agreement and tender of the earnest money to the 
initiator of the notice, no counter-cancellation notice can or should 
be served.  If, however, as outlined above, a seller or a buyer has 
initiated either of the cancellation proceedings and the served 
party has colorable grounds to contest the initiator’s entitlement to 
the earnest money (claiming either that the initiator was actually 
the one in default or, in the case of the buyer, that there was a 
failure of condition), there is little reason for the served party to 
forebear serving a counter-cancellation notice.  Service of a 
counter-cancellation notice, like service of an initial cancellation 
notice, will likely require the services of an attorney.  However, as 
previously noted, the cost of the counter-cancellation notice is far 
less than the cost of commencing a judicial proceeding and seeking 
an injunction which, even if successful, will often accomplish 
nothing more than is accomplished by a counter-cancellation—
preserving the opportunity of the served party to litigate 
entitlement to the earnest money. 
The only exception to the benefit of serving a counter-
cancellation is where the served party, typically a buyer, desires the 
remedy (or at least desires to preserve the potential remedy) of 
specific performance.  In that case, a counter-cancellation would 
 
 163. See id. 
 164. See id. 
40
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 12
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol31/iss2/12
12WERTHEIM 3/29/2005  2:52:42 PM 
2004]   RESIDENTIAL PURCHASE CANCELLATION 727 
automatically cancel the purchase agreement and make specific 
performance unavailable.  In that case, a buyer must instead seek 
and procure an injunction against cancellation. 
Except in the situation where a party is willing to bear the 
time, expense, and uncertainty of litigating a claim for specific 
performance (or at least desires to preserve the potential of that 
remedy), counter-cancellation is thus in the interest of the served 
party.  As long as there is a colorable basis for a counter-
cancellation, it is likely that well-advised parties to residential 
purchase agreements will seize such opportunities and trigger a 
stalemate.  Moreover, since the reason that the one party will 
initiate a statutory cancellation proceeding in the first instance will 
almost invariably be due to a dispute between the parties that 
precludes a voluntary cancellation of the purchase agreement, a 
section 559.217 cancellation notice will often be followed by a 
section 559.217 counter-cancellation notice like night following 
day. 
This analysis presumes that both the seller and buyer are 
informed regarding their legal rights and options.  Where the 
served party is not aware of the remedy and effect of counter-
cancellation165 or does not seek legal counsel, then, of course, the 
served party will not commence a counter-cancellation and the 
initial cancellation will become effective.  Also, in some cases a 
party may refuse to sign a voluntary cancellation agreement not 
based upon any recognizable legal theory, but simply out of anger 
or frustration due to the failure of the transaction.  In that 
situation, if that party is served with a section 559.217 notice, the 
served party is less likely to commence a counter-cancellation and 
the new legislation will have the beneficial effect of resolving the 
impasse. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The new legislation for cancellation of residential purchase 
agreements represents an effort to provide an expedited method of 
allowing sellers and buyers to resolve standoffs between the parties 
with the broker in the middle holding the earnest money.  It has 
the advantages over section 559.21 of speed, a remedy for the 
 
 165. While the statutory notices advise the party served of the availability of an 
injunction, they do not advise the party of the possibility of serving a counter-
cancellation.  Id. subd. 5. 
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buyer, and a means of confirming the cancellation based upon a 
failed condition. 
The underlying purpose of the new legislation is to provide a 
more efficient means of resolving seller-buyer standoffs.  One 
possible cost of this efficiency is the risk of bestowing windfalls on 
sellers in the form of earnest money that the purchase agreement 
required to be returned to the buyer.  Moreover, given the likely 
use of counter-cancellation notices, its unintended consequence, 
however, may simply be to require the parties to escalate their 
standoff by means of an exchange of formal, lawyer-drafted 
statutory notices.  These notices will release the parties from their 
obligations to consummate the purchase and sale transaction and 
will allow the seller to quickly remarket the property.  But with 
respect to what is often the more important matter of resolving the 
entitlement to the earnest money, the parties will likely be left in 
exactly the same position they would have been in without the 
legislation.  Given that result, one might question whether the 
entire scheme under the new section 559.217 is an improvement 
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